

THE
DISSENTERS
Loyalty.

Specimen 2.

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THE DISSENTERS Loyalty.

§. 2. **A** Second insinuation is, That Non-conformists are *turbulent, unperfwadable, ungovernable*: That their principles have a malignant influence upon Government: And for the more dextrous management of this suspicion, he tells us, *That it's a great blot in the Writings of Calvin, that after he had Discoursed rarely well of the Power of Princes, and of the Duty of Subjects, he Undoes all again with an unhappy exception in these words: De privatis hominibus semper loquor.*

I see if *Calvin* has but *one blot*, the *Enquirer* will hit it, so quick-sighted he is, that none must hope to take him with a *Why not?* I meet indeed with an Eagle-eyed Jesuit, who to palliate the villanies of their own Society, would gladly pick a hole in *Calvin's Coat*; but the Reverend, and Protestant Bishop *Bilson* roundly takes him up thus: *Calvin is so well known to those that be Learned and Wise, for his great pains and good labours in the Church of God, that a few snarling Fryers cannot impeach his good Name, though they never so wretchedly pervert his words.* And yet the Bishops Book came forth *Cum Privilegio*, and was Dedicated to *Q. Elizabeth*, by

one very Tender in the point of Supremacy and Prerogative. *Dialog. p. 509.* But *Calvin's* greatest Crime was his Syncretism with the *Doctrine of the Church*, and not his enmity to *the Civil Government*. And because a shred cut off from the whole piece of his Discourse may easily through ignorance be mis-contrued, or through Malice mis-represented to his prejudice, I shall present his words at large to the Reader, *Institut. lib. IV. cap. 20. parag. 31.*

‘ Nobis autem interim
 ‘ summoperè cavendum, ne
 ‘ illam plenam venerandæ
 ‘ Majestatis Magistratum
 ‘ auctoritatem, quam Deus
 ‘ gravissimis edictis sanxit,
 ‘ (Etiam si apud indignissi-
 ‘ mos resideat, & qui eam
 ‘ suâ nequitia, quantum in
 ‘ se est polluant) sperna-
 ‘ mus, aut violemus: Ne-
 ‘ que enim, si Ultio Domini,
 ‘ est effrænata dominatio-
 ‘ nis correctio, ideo protin-
 ‘ nus nobis demandatam
 ‘ arbitremur; quibus nul-
 ‘ lum aliud quam parendi,
 ‘ & patiendi, datum est
 ‘ Mandatum. De privatis
 ‘ hominibus semper lo-
 ‘ quor; Nam si qui nunc
 ‘ sint populares Magistra-
 ‘ tus ad moderandam Re-
 ‘ gum Libidinem constituti

*In the mean while we
 ought studiously to beware
 that we neither Despise nor
 Oppose the Authority of Ma-
 gistrates, so full of Dread
 and Majesty, which God
 himself hath established by
 most severe Decrees, (al-
 though possibly it should re-
 side in Persons most Unwor-
 thy; and such as by their per-
 sonal wickedness do defile it,
 as much as in them lyes.)
 For though the Divine ven-
 geance be the Restrainer of
 unbridled Empire, yet must
 we not thence imagine that
 the Management thereof is
 committed to Us. I speak al-
 ways of private persons: For
 if there should be any such
 popular Magistrates Consti-
 tuted to moderate the Arbi-
 trariness of Princes, (such
 (quales*

' (quales olim erant qui
 ' Lacedæmoniis Regi'us
 ' oppositi erant, Ephori;
 ' aut Romanis Consuli-
 ' bus, Tribuni plebis; aut
 ' Atheniensium Senatui,
 ' Demarchi; & quâ etiam
 ' fortè potestate, ut nunc
 ' res habent funguntur
 ' in singulis regnis Tres
 ' Ordines, quum prima-
 ' rios conventûs pera-
 ' gunt) adeo illos, fero-
 ' cienti Regum Licentiæ
 ' pro officio intercedere
 ' non veto; ut si ii, Re-
 ' gibus impotenter, gras-
 ' santibus, & humili plebe-
 ' culæ insultantibus, conni-
 ' veant, eorum dissimula-
 ' tionem nefariâ perfidiâ
 ' non carere, affirmem;
 ' quia populi Libertatem
 ' cujus se Dci Ordina-
 ' tione tutores positos, nô-
 ' runt, fraudulenter pro-
 ' dunt.

*as of old were the Ephori,
 who balanced the Lacedæ-
 monian Kings. The Tri-
 bunes of the People, who
 moderated the Roman Con-
 suls, or the Demarchi, who
 were the same to the Senate
 of Athens: And which po-
 wer (as things go now) the
 Three Estates in each King-
 dom, when they are Conven-
 ned in full Parliament, do
 peradventure enjoy, I am so
 far from forbidding them to
 intercede according to their
 duty, with the furious Licen-
 tiousness of Kings, that if they
 shall connive at them when
 they passionately harass, and
 trample upon the poor Com-
 monalty, I may affirm that
 their silence cannot be excu-
 sed of sinful breach of Trust,
 seeing they falsely betray the
 Peoples Liberty, whereof they
 knew themselves to be Guar-
 dians by Gods Institution.*

Reader! These are those *dismal* lines which have
 raised the clamour against poor Calvin, wherein thou
 wilt observe these particulars.

I. That *Private Persons* have no warrant from God
 to restrain the exorbitances of Governours, but are left
 to

to the only Remedy *Parendi, & Patiendi*, of submission and patience.

2. Yet he supposes that some Magistrates may possibly have a larger power than *Bare Suffering, or Passive Obedience*.

3. This power which he supposes may possibly be entrusted with them, is but *ferocienti Regum licentiae Pro Officio intercedere*: Dutifully to intercede with the Prince to redress grievances, humbly to represent the Invasions made upon Propriety, or perhaps (if called) to Counsel and Advise a Redress: which is a power far greater than that of *Bare Suffering*, and enduring the evil, and yet infinitely short of Rebellion against, Deposing, Banishing, or Murdering Princes.

4. This is only upon a supposition that there be such Persons so qualified, and entrusted by *the constitution of the Government*, and known Laws of the Land, *Si qui sint populares Magistratus constituti*. Such he Supposes indeed the *Ephori* at *Lacedæmon*, the *Tribunes* at *Rome*, the *Demarchi* at *Athens* to have been; but he's Not sure, 'tis but a *Peradventure*, there were any such in his time, *qua etiam fortè potestate (ut nunc se res habent) funguntur in singulis Regnis Tres Ordines*. For he knew pretty well how their own little Common-wealth at *Geneva* was Governed, but the Models of *France, Spain*, and other Sovereign Monarchies he had but a guess at; he had heard, perhaps, of *Les Etats Generaux* in *France*, but he was Not very certain whether they had any such *interceding Authority* or no; however, or whatsoever it was, it could not be exerted but in *full Convention of the Estates in a general Dyet*. *Cùm primarios Conventus peragunt*, and then was the time to Petition, to make Addresses in a *Submissive way* for the redress of grievances.

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And 5. the guilt he charges upon these popular Magistrates for betraying their trust, arises from this alone, that they *cennived at the miserable harrassings of the Commonalty*, they took no *notice at all* of the Invasions upon the Subjects Rights and Proprieties: which they might have done, and never have mingled Heaven and Earth together with Civil broyls. And what can an ordinary Eye espy hence, that should justify the *Enquirers* outcry, a *passage* (says he) *of that ill Aspect upon Government, that it is suspected by some, and not altogether without cause, that Most of the Confusions of Kingdoms, that have happen'd since, and especially the troubles of this Nation, have received Encouragement, if not taken Rise from hence.*

If this *Enquirer* (or any other) has formerly contributed to the confusions and troubles of This, or Any other Nation, and received encouragement from this place of *Calvin*, he ought,

1. To be deeply humbled before God, that he should draw such desperate Conclusions as those of Rebellion out of an Innocent Sentence, and give more essential proofs, and signal marks of Repentance, than accepting a Benefice of three or four hundred *per annum*.

And 2ly. be ashamed that he ventured to read *Calvin*, before he could well construe a piece of plain Latin; for I cannot understand that *Calvin*, though he was bound to write true Latin, was also bound to help every one to a Construing-book; no, God obliges no man to prevent all the evil consequences which an evil heart and base lusts might draw out of the most Inoffensive expressions.

He that will give scope to suspicions, may easily conjecture where the *Enquirer* might drink in those principles

ciples which have such an ill Aspect upon Government ; he needed not have travelled to the *Lake Lemane* ; his own Incomparable *Fugo* could have furnisht him with *Maxims* of that Tendency : *Ignatius Loyola* himself might have been Scholar to such a Master : I shall refer the Reader only to his Famous piece *de Jure Belli, & Pacis*, lib. I cap. 4. §. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. A place conteining many passages of that ill Aspect upon Government, "that it's suspected by some, and upon good grounds, that most of the Civil Wars which have hap-
 "pen'd since in Europe, have received Encouragement, if
 "not taken Rise from Thence. Let him try if he can find in Calvin, such a passage as this : *Potest Rex etiam Suam Imperii partem amittere.*

Or this : *Regi in partem Non suam involanti, Vis justa opponi potest.*

Or this other : *Qui Principes sub populo sunt, sive ab initio talem acceperunt potestatem, sive postea ita convenit, (ut Lacedemone) si peccent in Leges, ac Rempublicam, non tantum vi repelli possunt, sed si opus sit, Morte puniri.* But I shall spare Loyal Ears, and only leave this Caution : *Quiescat porro monco, & desinat Laccessere, malefacta ne noscat sua.*

F I N I S.